The ill-informed : consent to medical treatment and the therapeutic exception. by Cave,  Emma
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
21 April 2017
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Cave, Emma (2017) 'The ill-informed : consent to medical treatment and the therapeutic exception.',
Common law world review. .
Further information on publisher's website:
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/CLW
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
http://journals.sagepub.com/home/clw
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
The Ill-Informed: Consent to Medical Treatment and the Therapeutic Exception 
 
Emma Cave, Professor of Healthcare Law, Durham University, Durham Law School, UK. 
Email: emma.cave@durham.ac.uk 
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in 
the Common Law World Review, SAGE Journals, following peer review. It is accessible 
here: http://journals.sagepub.com/home/clw  
Acknowledgements 
Many thanks to Professor Margot Brazier and Professor José Miola for their very helpful 
comments on previous drafts and to the anonymous reviewers. 
 
Abstract 
Affirming the doctrine of informed consent, the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire HB belatedly followed the Australian decision of Rogers v Whitaker, decoupling 
the duty to inform patients about the material risks of medical treatment from Bolam. The 
underlying commitment to patient autonomy coincides with a wider body of medical law 
that protects the right of capacitous adult patients to make treatment decisions, even if 
others consider those decisions bizarre and even if they will cause the patient serious harm. 
It is seemingly anomalous, therefore, that the Supreme Court in Montgomery referred to a 
‘therapeutic exception’, as this suggests an underlying paternalistic approach. Contrary to 
this view, international examples suggest that a therapeutic exception does not necessarily 
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conflict with commitment to patient autonomy. In some countries, the exception mitigates 
the effects of a broadly objective test of materiality by enabling clinicians in exceptional 
circumstances to protect the autonomy interests of the particular patient. In others, it 
protects those incapable of an autonomous decision from harm. In England and Wales, 
however, alternative mechanisms can be interpreted to protect such patients from harm. 
On this basis it is argued that the therapeutic exception is obfuscatory, unnecessary and 
unjustified. 
 
Keywords 
Informed consent, materiality of risk, therapeutic privilege, therapeutic exception, 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire, negligence, Rogers v Whitaker. 
 
Introduction: Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board  
In 2015 the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board1 (Montgomery) 
appeared on one hand to strike down the long tradition of medical paternalism that allowed 
clinicians to decide what patients should be told and on the other to revive paternalism by 
granting sanction to the notion of therapeutic exception. In the United States, Australia and 
Canada the therapeutic exception is also recognised in law, resulting in similar 
jurisprudential tensions. Exploring the origins and historical justifications of the therapeutic 
exception, this article demonstrates that in England and Wales, it is no longer relevant or 
necessary.   
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In England and Wales, medical treatment without a valid consent constitutes a trespass 
to the person and a criminal law assault.2 Validity depends on the patient being ‘informed in 
broad terms of the nature of the procedure’.3 Less draconian implications flow from a 
failure to provide information on the risks and implications of treatment, which can result in 
a claim in negligence. Clinicians exercise clinical judgement in determining what treatment 
to recommend, and are under no obligation to provide futile or overly burdensome 
treatment.4 Nor are they required to give the patient all the available information 
concerning the treatment and its alternatives.5 Rather, the clinician6 must take reasonable 
care to inform the patient of ‘material risks’. What is considered material would on a 
utopian conception involve the courts asking whether patients were given the information 
that they required in the particular circumstances.7 At first this was considered beyond the 
capacity of the law and a more objective test was settled upon. The test set out in Bolam v 
Friern Hospital Management Committee8 (Bolam), which governs the standard of care for 
professional persons, requires that clinicians act in a manner ‘accepted as proper by a 
responsible body of medical men skilled in that particular art’.9  
The relevance of the Bolam test to information disclosure has been the source of much 
academic (Brazier, 1987; Brazier and Miola, 2000; Jones, 1999; Miola, 2009) and judicial10 
debate. In the 1985 House of Lords judgment of Sidaway11 the judges agreed that the 
appeal should be dismissed because an undisclosed risk was not considered material. 
However, they varied considerably in their views of what constituted a material risk. Lord 
Scarman alone contended that Bolam should not determine the issue; a view upheld in 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and some states in the US. In the seminal United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia case of Canterbury v Spence12 the prudent 
professional test was rejected in favour of a rights-based approach that focused on the 
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hypothetical reasonable patient. The Australian High Court in Rogers v Whitaker13 went 
further still, adding a subjective limb to the objective prudent patient test. This requires 
clinicians to disclose risks where they are aware or should be aware that the particular 
patient would find them significant. 
In Montgomery14 the Supreme Court considered liability in negligence for failure to 
disclosure material risks to patients as part of the process of informed consent. Nadine 
Montgomery was awarded £5.2m compensation following birth complications. She was of 
small stature and had gestational diabetes and had expressed anxieties about vaginal 
delivery. Her obstetrician failed to warn of shoulder dystocia and her son was born with 
cerebral palsy. The court found that had her son been born by elective caesarean section, it 
is more probable than not that he would have been born uninjured.15  
In their joint judgment, Lords Kerr and Reed (with whom the other Justices agreed16) 
distinguished between cases concerning errors in treatment and diagnosis where the test 
set down in Bolam will continue to apply, and cases concerning the disclosure of risk and 
treatment alternatives which, it was held, are not purely a matter of professional judgement 
and cannot be decided by reference to a responsible body of medical opinion.17 
Montgomery asserts and cements a position that has for some time been adopted in 
practice.18 The Supreme Court declared that Lord Scarman in Sidaway had represented 
substantially the correct position, subject to the Rogers v Whitaker ‘refinement’.19 Setting 
out a revised test, Lords Kerr and Reed stated:  
The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the 
patient is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and 
of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test of materiality is 
whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the 
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patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or 
should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach 
significance to it.20 
Henceforth, unless patients do not want to be so informed,21 physicians must discuss the 
risks of treatment and make patients aware of alternatives. Gone is the single 
comprehensive legal standard that applied to both treatment and advice. Montgomery 
separates those aspects of medical decision-making that require expert knowledge (such as 
treatment) and those that do not (such as advice on the risks of treatment and its 
alternatives).  
The new test is subject to two exceptions. The first is uncontroversial; a ‘necessity 
exception’ exists where urgent treatment is required and the patient is unable to make a 
decision.22 The second is more problematic. The ‘therapeutic exception’ (TE) applies when 
disclosure would ‘be seriously detrimental to the patient’s health’.23 Whilst the newly 
articulated test for materiality has resulted in extensive academic commentary (Badenoch, 
2016; Bagshaw, 2016; Beswick, 2015; Campbell, 2015; Heywood, 2015; Hobson, 2016; 
McGrath, 2015; Montgomery and Montgomery, 2016; Reid, 2015) the therapeutic exception 
has received much less attention, despite its seemingly incongruous place in a judgment 
that professes to adopt a patient-focused position intended to uphold autonomy rights 
(New Law Journal, 2015).24  
This article explores the ambits of the TE, considering the dicta in Montgomery and other 
domestic decisions and international comparisons. It does not consider the potential 
application of the TE in relation to prognosis and diagnosis (see Hodkinson, 2013: p 121) or 
the use of placebos (see Chan, 2015), focusing instead on the role of the TE within the 
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doctrine of informed consent and the revised test for materiality of risk.25 The article begins 
with the influences and development of the TE, linking its justifications to a wider body of 
medical law and to the significance of patient autonomy. A change in nomenclature from 
therapeutic privilege (TP) to therapeutic exception is, it is argued, indicative of a narrowing 
of its scope, but the purpose and limits of the TE await judicial clarification. 
The second section considers the influence of other common law jurisdictions in the 
Supreme Court’s revision of the test for materiality and acceptance of the TE.26 It is argued 
that the apparent widespread acknowledgement of the TE disguises a restrictive approach 
to its application. In light of this, the third section sets out objections to the TE, including its 
propensity to obscure legal principle and confuse the operation of informed consent in 
practice. The final section concludes that there are two possible justifications for a TE which 
are consistent with modern day formulations of patient autonomy. One exists where the 
legal system promulgates an objective test which prevents clinicians from paying due regard 
to the particular patient’s preferences regarding risk disclosure. Another exists where the 
legal system cannot protect the interests of vulnerable people in circumstances where the 
disclosure of material information will render them unable to make an autonomous decision 
about treatment. It is argued that neither condition exists in England and Wales. On this 
basis, the TE is unnecessary, conceptually flawed and should be disallowed.  
The article seeks to influence the domestic development of the TE in law and practice, 
but also has broader relevance to debates around the limitations of the doctrine of 
informed consent to protect patient choice and its interaction with the mental capacity 
framework. It concerns a grey area common to many jurisdictions that struggle to protect 
from serious harm those who are considered vulnerable by virtue of their inability to make 
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an autonomous choice, whilst concurrently upholding legal commitment to the right of 
patients with mental capacity to make treatment decisions that others consider irrational.  
 
1. The therapeutic exception 
i. Developing a therapeutic privilege in England and Wales 
There is a lack of clarity in the terminology surrounding therapeutic justifications for non-
disclosure. The term ‘therapeutic privilege’ was coined before the legal duty to disclosure 
was even established (President’s Commission, 1982: p 95, citing Meisel, 1977: p 99). Its 
ambits differ across time and place, and some countries now refer instead to a therapeutic 
‘exception’, for reasons that will become apparent in this section. In England and Wales few 
cases refer to the therapeutic privilege, even fewer apply it and none have accepted it as a 
defence. This does not indicate that the privilege was never applied in clinical practice. That 
the courts paid so little attention to its development is understandable given that it was, at 
least initially, of dubious practical importance. After all, it formed only a small part of the 
wide paternalistic privileges bestowed on medical practitioners in law. Under what was 
initially accepted as the Sidaway test, doctors only had to tell patients what a responsible 
body of doctors would consider reasonable. There was considerable scope to exclude 
information that other doctors would consider detrimental to patients’ best interests. Jones 
(1999: p 113) has argued that the therapeutic privilege did not apply as an exception to the 
duty to disclose information but rather ‘it is incorporated within the duty of disclosure itself 
applying Sidaway’ (see also Grubb, 1988: p 138). The privilege formed part of the broader 
issue of clinical judgement, which is dominated by beneficence. Current practitioner 
guidance exhorting doctors to ‘treat each patient as an individual’ (General Medical Council 
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2013: para 2), flows from the World Medical Association Declaration of Geneva, adopted in 
1948.27 The objective prudent professional standard potentially conflicted with this 
guidance when it was objectively reasonable to disclose a risk, but doing so would harm the 
particular patient. In other words, the clinician might reasonably believe that information 
that would enhance autonomy and choice in the average patient would cause acute anxiety 
and potentially result in the refusal of beneficial treatment in the particular patient. In such 
circumstances, the therapeutic privilege has historically justified withholding the harmful 
information. Thus, in McAllister v Lewisham & North Southwark Health Authority28 Rougier J 
held that the therapeutic privilege applied where: 
a doctor may be genuinely and reasonably so convinced that a particular operation is 
in the patient's best interests that he is justified in being somewhat economical with 
the truth where recital of the dangers is concerned. Again that all comes within the 
umbrella of a question of clinical judgement. 
This led to a tension, outlined by Jackson (2006: p 281), because the objective approach 
to the standard of care was subject to a subjective (therapeutic) exception:  
Why should doctors be entitled to take into account the patient’s special sensibilities 
when deciding not to tell her about a particular risk, while her individual and perhaps 
idiosyncratic preferences do not determine whether the doctor should positively 
disclose information?  
But the courts were reluctant to trespass on applications of clinical judgement that 
operated in patients’ therapeutic interests. Patients held the power to decline information 
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but doctors could override patient autonomy where they felt it was in the patient’s best 
interests to do so.  
ii. The dawn of patient autonomy 
As the dominance of Sidaway diminished in practice,29 further contradictions emerged. On 
one hand, as dominant liberal philosophies increased emphasis on self-determination, a 
broad TP became increasingly difficult to justify. On the other hand, it was clear that whilst 
an objective prudent patient test would enhance deference to patient choice, it was not a 
panacea (Miola, 2009). Clinicians remained conflicted where their professional duty to 
disclose information that a reasonable average patient would desire would cause the 
particular patient harm. Thus, accompanying Lord Scarman’s (minority) rights-based 
approach to risk disclosure, was an overt recognition of the TP as an exception to the 
general rule30 where it would be ‘detrimental to the health (including, of course, the mental 
health) of his patient’.31 Later, in Chester v Afshar Lord Steyn too recognised (obiter) that a 
therapeutic privilege might exceptionally apply where it is justified in the patient’s best 
interests.32  
The best interests justification had troublesome implications. First and foremost, it blurs 
the boundary between capacitous and non-capacitous decisions. But it generates additional 
inconsistencies. If there is a duty to protect best interests then it should arguably make no 
difference whether or not the patient asks for information about the risks which a 
reasonable patient (or professional) would consider material. And yet, the doctor’s duty to 
respond to the patient’s questions is explicit in Sidaway.33 It is not clear how the legal right 
to know and the doctor’s duty to disclose are dependent upon the patient asking for 
disclosure of material risks.34 Also, if there is a duty to protect best interests, one might 
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expect the courts to award damages for the communication of harmful information. Whilst 
an argument might be made to establish a duty of care based on an assumption of 
responsibility (Fay, 2012), the courts have proved reluctant to allow a claim for insensitive 
communication of correct information.35 
The only domestic case to deal - if tangentially - with the therapeutic privilege, placed a 
restraint on the best interests approach. It made clear that best interests cannot be used as 
a blanket rationale to justify non-disclosure of information and recognised the value of 
information even where it causes distress and even if it might result in refusal of consent. 
The case in question - AB v Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust36 - did not involve treatment 
of a patient, but retention of tissue from deceased children without parental consent. The 
public outcry following two public inquiries resulted in group litigation. The defendants 
argued that providing information about the retention of tissue would have caused 
unnecessary distress to parents that could result in psychiatric harm. In essence the claim 
was that the therapeutic privilege applied. The claim was rejected. Gage J stated: ‘In so far 
as it involved the exercise of a therapeutic judgment it was one which does not appear to 
have been exercised on a case by case basis.’37 As has now been confirmed in 
Montgomery,38 for the therapeutic exception to apply, it must be considered separately in 
relation to each individual.  
Current General Medical Council guidance (2008: paras 16-17) goes further still in its 
restriction of the best interests approach, seizing on Lord Steyn’s view in Chester v Afshar 
that the therapeutic privilege should only apply in exceptional circumstances. The guidance 
recognises that information might be withheld ‘where giving it would cause the patient 
serious harm. In this context “serious harm” means more than that the patient might 
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become upset or decide to refuse treatment.’ (See also Department of Health, 2009: paras 
19-21).  
This position conforms with that taken in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which restricts 
the application of the best interests test to situations where the person (P) lacks capacity.39 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects the right to a private 
and family life, has been applied by the European Court of Human Rights to protect and 
uphold autonomy rights.40  In domestic common law too, commitment to upholding adult 
patients’ capacitous choice is clear. In Re MB Butler-Sloss LJ stated:  
A mentally competent patient has an absolute right to refuse to consent to medical 
treatment for any reason, rational or irrational, or for no reason at all, even where 
that decision may lead to his or her own death.41  
As Jones (2008: p 551) has stated, the right to refuse treatment exists ‘even where there 
are overwhelming medical reasons in favour of the treatment’. 
iii. Montgomery and the therapeutic exception 
The therapeutic privilege is not referred to in Montgomery. Instead Lords Kerr and Reed 
carve out a limited therapeutic ‘exception’42 to the duty to disclose material risks. The 
change in terminology was not explained and is unlikely to signal a complete disconnection 
from the case law outlining a therapeutic privilege. It is probable, however that the 
Supreme Court Justices sought to emphasise the limited scope of the exception and move 
away from the paternalistic perceptions of ‘privilege’ as an integral aspect of the duty of 
disclosure. ‘Privilege’ implied a special status for doctors that contrasted sharply with other 
professions. In common with professional guidance, Lords Kerr and Reed limit the exception 
to disclosures that are ‘seriously detrimental to the patient’s health’,43 cautioning that it 
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‘cannot provide the basis of the general rule’.44 The decision signals a death knell for a 
therapeutic privilege applied to protect the best interests of patients, making clear that the 
TE should not be used to prevent patients making informed choices ‘which the doctor 
considers to be contrary to her best interests’.45 Departing from medical paternalism,46 the 
judgment firmly upholds commitment to patient choice: 
[S]ocial and legal developments … point away from a model based upon a view of 
the patient as being entirely dependent on information provided by the doctor. 
What they point towards is an approach to the law which … treats them so far as 
possible as adults who are capable of understanding that medical treatment is 
uncertain of success and may involve risk, accepting responsibility for the taking of 
risks affecting their own lives, and living with the consequences of their choices.47  
The Supreme Court asserts that ‘patients are now widely regarded as persons holding 
rights, rather than as the passive recipients of the care of the medical profession.’48 Lady 
Hale recognises that the pregnant woman ‘cannot force her doctor to offer treatment which 
he or she considers futile or inappropriate. But she is at least entitled to the information 
which will enable her to take a proper part in that decision.’49  
Accordingly, there are three ways in which the uncertainties of the pre-Montgomery case 
law on the therapeutic privilege are ameliorated: 
(1) The general rule on disclosure of risk exists to protect patient rights to autonomy 
and freedom to decide.50  
(2) The name change from ‘therapeutic privilege’ to ‘therapeutic exception’ implies a 
defence to a claim for non-disclosure rather than an aspect of the duty of disclosure. 
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(3) The TE will apply where the physician reasonably believes disclosure would cause 
serious detriment to the patient’s health. It is a limited exception which must not be 
abused.51 
However, several issues are left to future development. The exception was not relevant 
on the facts and the Supreme Court declined to further articulate its scope.52 We cannot 
turn to the pre-Montgomery case law because, as we have seen, it is sparse, conceptually 
confused and is inextricably linked to the test for materiality which Montgomery subjected 
to change. At least three questions remain to be answered: 
(1) According to what standard will physicians who invoke the TE be judged?  
(2) What sort of serious harm will justify its use (see Hobson, 2015)? 
(3) What is its justification and is it really necessary? 
Montgomery may have provided a ‘very explicit and belated obituary’ (Foster, 2015) to 
one aspect of medical paternalism, but it leaves another aspect up in the air.  
2. International jurisprudence   
It is common knowledge that the TE is relevant to a number of jurisdictions that adopt the 
prudent patient test.53 It seems reasonable to assume that this was a relevant factor in the 
Supreme Court’s decision to retain the exception. What is less well-known is that the TE is 
not by any means an inevitable corollary of a prudent patient test and that its application is 
rare and constrained. This section examines the application of therapeutic justifications for 
non-disclosure of material risks in the USA, Canada and Australia and concludes that the 
defence is in its death throes. 
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In the US, the therapeutic privilege has been recognised in one form or another since the 
1800s.54 In the 1960 case of Natanson v Kline55 the Supreme Court of Kansas recognised that 
‘Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thoroughgoing self-determination’ but 
accepted certain exceptions:  
There is probably a privilege on therapeutic grounds, to withhold the specific 
diagnosis where the disclosure of cancer or some other dread disease would 
seriously jeopardise the recovery of an unstable, temperamental or severely 
depressed patient. 
Early cases emphasised the principle ‘first, do no harm’ allowing physicians considerable 
scope to decide when and how far to sacrifice truth for beneficence. For example, in 
Wilkinson v Vessey the Supreme Court of Rhode Island accepted nondisclosure where ‘the 
doctor makes an affirmative showing that the non-disclosure was in the best interests of the 
patient.’56 Other states were more cautious, limiting the scope of the therapeutic privilege 
out of recognition of the central importance of information to decision-making. In the 1957 
Salgo case, where the term ‘informed consent’ was first coined, it was recognised that:  
a physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he 
withholds any facts … necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the 
patient to the proposed treatment.57  
The court recognised that the therapeutic privilege is relevant where disclosure would 
cloud decision-making capacity and where it would result in physical or psychological harm. 
Similarly, in the 1977 Maryland case of Sard v Hardy58 it was held that the privilege applies: 
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in those cases where a complete and candid disclosure of possible alternatives and 
consequences might have a detrimental effect on the physical or psychological well-
being of the patient, or where the patient is incapable of giving his consent by 
reason of mental disability or infancy, or has specifically requested that he not be 
told. 
This approach was emulated in Cornfeldt v Tongen,59 where the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota recognised the relevance of the therapeutic privilege where disclosure would 
either complicate or hinder treatment, preclude a rational decision, or cause psychological 
harm. 
However, the social transformation of informed consent to reflect individualist values 
(Dolgin, 2010), the development of dedicated frameworks to protect patients who lack 
capacity and recognition that the right to consent and refuse treatment has constitutional 
foundations in the US Supreme Court decision in Cruzan v Director, Missouri Department of 
Health,60 resulted in a more restrictive approach to the therapeutic privilege. In 1982 the 
President’s Commission (p 95) favoured circumscribing the therapeutic privilege so that it 
would apply where the disclosure itself would cause harm rather than to prevent refusals of 
beneficial treatment. At first, judicial warnings not to abuse the privilege sufficed. The court 
in Canterbury v Spence proposed limitations and sound medical judgement to ‘carefully 
circumscribe’ the privilege, ‘for otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule itself’.61 The 
therapeutic privilege would apply where disclosure posed a threat to the patient which 
made disclosure ‘unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of view’. Though the 
term ‘therapeutic privilege’ endured, there are clear parallels with the TE in Montgomery, in 
that the therapeutic justification for non-disclosure was increasingly viewed as a limited 
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exception to the general rule that material risks must be communicated, applying so as to 
avert a risk of serious harm.62  
Today many States have Codes governing informed consent and some of these 
incorporate a TE. For example, New York refers to four statutory defences to negligent non-
disclosure of risk including common knowledge, refusal of proffered information, 
emergency and the therapeutic privilege.63 The latter allows the doctor to adapt the 
‘manner and extent’ of the disclosure to protect the patient from harm. Where the State 
has a relevant code and it does not expressly refer to a TE, it is unlikely the exception would 
apply. For example, in LcCaze v Collier the Louisiana Supreme Court stated:  
A physician withholding information under such a therapeutic privilege could never 
have a valid consent under the Uniform Consent Law if the withheld risk was covered 
in the statute.64  
Those states that continue to recognise a form of TE do so in contravention of 
professional guidance from the American Medical Association Council on Ethical and Judicial 
Affairs: 
Withholding medical information from patients without their knowledge or consent 
is ethically unacceptable. Physicians should encourage patients to specify their 
preferences regarding communication of their medical information, preferably 
before the information becomes available. Moreover, physicians should honor 
patient requests not to be informed of certain medical information or to convey the 
information to a designated proxy, provided these requests appear to genuinely 
represent the patient’s own wishes. (Bostick, Sade, McMahon et al., 2006: p 306). 
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The AMA (2016: chapter 2.1.3) encourages doctors to explore preferences regarding 
communication; to honour requests for non-disclosure; and sometimes to delay disclosure, 
but is clear that truthfulness and openness are essential components of respect for 
autonomy and of trust.  
A restrictive stance is also taken in Australia. As we have seen, Rogers v Whitaker65 
provided that physicians have a duty to warn patients of the material risks inherent in the 
proposed treatment. A risk is material if a reasonable person in the patient’s position would 
be likely to attach significance to it if warned of that risk. The majority recognise the 
relevance of the therapeutic privilege66 but Gaudron J in a separate addition to the Rogers v 
Whitaker judgment sought to limit its scope: 
I see no basis for any exception or ‘therapeutic privilege’ which is not based in 
medical emergency or in considerations of the patient's ability to receive, 
understand or properly evaluate the significance of the information that would 
ordinarily be required with respect to his or her condition or the treatment 
proposed.67 
Since then there are, as far as I am aware, only two reported cases raising the 
therapeutic privilege. In Tai v Saxon,68 the Western Australian Supreme Court held that in a 
non-essential procedure, a failure to warn on grounds that it would cause the patient harm 
was not sufficient to invoke the therapeutic privilege. The therapeutic privilege was 
successfully argued in Battersby v Tottman where non-disclosure of information was 
thought necessary to avert the risk that treatment for suicidal thoughts would be rejected 
by the patient.69 It is suggested later in this article that in England and Wales the same 
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protection might be achieved utilizing the best interests framework set out in the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005.  
The dicta of Gaudron J may have restricted the scope of the therapeutic privilege in 
Australia but a more restrictive stance still is taken in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada 
addressed the issue of informed consent in Reibl v Hughes,70 setting out an objective test 
which considers whether a reasonable person in the circumstances of the plaintiff would 
have consented to the proposed treatment if all the risks had been disclosed. Hodkinson 
(2013) argues that an exception to the duty to disclose is implicit in the following statement 
in Reibl v Hughes: 
it may be the case that a particular patient may, because of emotional factors, be 
unable to cope with facts relevant to recommended surgery or treatment and the 
doctor may, in such a case, be justified in withholding or generalizing information as 
to which he would otherwise be required to be more specific.71 
However, though the Supreme Court recognised that disclosure may not be feasible in an 
emergency, it did not expressly adopt the therapeutic exception. Nor does it appear to have 
been adopted in Codes on consent which some states and provinces have promulgated. In 
Ontario’s Health Care Consent Act 1996,72 for example, Section 10 sets out the key principle 
of ‘no treatment without consent’. This is subject only to a determination of incapacity or 
emergency. The latter applies both to patients lacking capacity (section 25(3)) and those 
with capacity but who lack the ability to communicate due to language or disability and 
where time is of the essence (section 25(2)). In other cases, consent must be informed 
which means the person must receive information ‘that a reasonable person in the same 
circumstances would require in order to make a decision about the treatment’ (Health Care 
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Consent Act 1996, s 11(2)). In Meyers Estate et al v Rogers73 Justice Maloney stated that ‘the 
Supreme Court of Canada has not, in Reibl, adopted or even approved the therapeutic 
privilege exception in Canada’. And in Pittman Estate v Bain74 the Ontario Court refused to 
accept the TE when a doctor failed to tell a patient that his wife had contracted HIV. Edwin 
(2008) argues that these cases show that ‘the patient's right to be informed takes 
precedence over the doctor's exercise of discretion’. The restrictive Canadian approach 
emphasises the fiduciary nature of the doctor patient relationship.75 The fiduciary 
relationship flows from the dependence and trust patients put in the medical profession and 
contrasts with the contractual origins of the doctor patient relationship in the UK and 
Australia. 
In conclusion, the Australian, Canadian and US jurisdictions all recognise exceptions to 
the rule requiring disclosure of material risks (however that might be defined). The most 
widely recognised exception is the emergency exception, and most recognise that, when the 
emergency is over, the information should be relayed. Some jurisdictions also accept that 
obvious risks need not be disclosed, and most make clear that patients can decide not to be 
informed of material risks. In the United States, only around half of the states accepted the 
‘reasonable patient’ approach put forward in Canterbury (Dolgin, 2010: p 101).76 Of those, 
not all accepted the TE (Borron, 2016). Rather the TE must be justified in light of the 
approach to patient choice, the adopted test for materiality and the provisions for 
protecting those unable to make a capacitous decision. The international moves to patient-
centered standards of disclosure and more sophisticated frameworks governing mental 
capacity have restricted the number of cases in which the exception is successfully invoked. 
Some jurisdictions now avoid the term ‘privilege’ to distance the exception from a best 
interests justification. Conversely, by referring to ‘privilege’ rather than ‘exception’, some 
20 
 
states may seek to ensure that the term is not employed as a defence or exception. Rather it 
refers to the physician’s limited discretion to respond to emergencies and to protect the 
best interests of patients lacking capacity. In the US, the AMA’s strong stance is indicative of 
the international approach to a legal principle in its death throes. Trust and autonomy are 
not compatible with the withholding of information necessary to make an informed 
decision. They are compatible with beneficence which is maintained by sensitivity to the 
patient needs and adjustments in the way the information is disclosed. 
3. The dangers of obfuscation  
Restrictions in the scope of the TE in Montgomery and professional guidance make it 
unlikely that doctors will ride roughshod over patient rights to make informed treatment 
decisions. And yet, the scope and application of the TE matters for two principle reasons. 
First, the vague and poorly articulated defence is unfair to doctors. Consent is a dynamic 
process. The risk of a procedure and the possible consequences of having and not having it, 
and the alternatives to treatment and their relative risks and benefits can remain static or 
change many times in the course of the doctor-patient discussions. What concerns doctors 
is the mechanics of obtaining consent and Montgomery has potential to enhance the fear of 
litigation. The vague TE does nothing to assuage this and may even exacerbate the problem. 
Neither the judgment nor the GMC give adequate guidance on the meaning of serious harm 
in this context and clinicians may rightly complain that the legal exhortations to put the 
individual patient first and to avoid causing serious harm whilst observing what is 
predominantly an objective and hypothetical standard of disclosure, are both complex and 
obscure. The Royal College of Surgeons (2016: para 4.2) warns that: ‘The possibility of this 
[therapeutic] exception presents significant legal difficulties for doctors’. 
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i. Legal conundrums 
In law too, commitment to the TE is problematic for a number of reasons. The TE does not 
apply to other professions (see Pattinson, 2014: para 4-029). Barristers cannot avoid telling 
their clients of the risk that the case will be lost although it will cause emotional breakdown, 
just as well-meaning Professors cannot withhold catastrophic marks from their students for 
fear that the news will exacerbate an underlying medical condition. Furthermore, the 
privilege has potential to result in an overly-complicated legal approach. Lords Kerr and 
Reed recognised that the new test for disclosure may result in less certainty and more 
litigation.77 Clinicians will find it harder to predict whether the court will consider their 
decision not to disclose a risk unreasonable. In Sidaway, the four judgments differed 
considerably in their positions on the distinction between diagnosis / treatment and 
disclosure of risk (see Hoppe and Miola, 2014: p 80). In subsequent cases,78 Lord Diplock’s 
position initially carried the day. This asserted that clinicians are under: 
[A] single comprehensive duty… not subject to dissection into a number of 
component parts to which different criteria of what satisfy the duty of care apply, 
such as diagnosis, treatment and advice.79 
Montgomery presents a more complicated picture, drawing distinctions between 
different aspects of practice. Jonathan and Elsa Montgomery (2016: pp 93-94) argue that 
the distinction is confused and confusing: 
It is not clear what type of skill and judgement is being applied if it is not ‘medical’. 
Nor does the Court explain what test is to be used to assess whether such non-
medical skills and judgements have been exercised appropriately. There is a radical 
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shift from the position that everything that doctors do needs to be seen as ‘medical’ 
(the position in Sidaway) to the position that unless every aspect of the decision is 
driven by ‘medical science’ it is not a matter of professional expertise.  
The Court stated that unpredictability is an acceptable price to pay: ‘respect for the 
dignity of patients requires no less.’80 But the existence of the TE adds a layer of obfuscation 
that is difficult to justify. One issue is that it is not clear who will bear the burden of proving 
that the exercise of TE was unreasonable. It seems unlikely that it will be the claimant. The 
change in terminology from ‘privilege’ to ‘exception’ supports the view that it is the clinician 
who must show that the withholding of information is a ‘reasonable exercise of medical 
judgment’.81 Another issue is that the court in Montgomery states that when deciding how 
to explain the risks, the judgement is not a matter for the Bolam test.82 But where 
information is considered detrimental to the health of the patient, it is not clear how 
reasonableness would be determined. If the operation of the TE is seen as a matter of 
medical expertise then it will require medical evidence. If so, the court could not ‘give effect 
to any preference it may have for one responsible body of professional opinion over 
another, provided that it is satisfied that both qualify as responsible bodies of medical 
opinion’.83 In short, the Bolam test would apply. We have seen that, in Sidaway Lord 
Scarman argued that a prudent patient test would be subject to the therapeutic privilege. 
Lord Scarman opined that the onus of proof would be on the clinician and that medical 
evidence would be necessary to judge its veracity:  
[The therapeutic privilege’s] true analysis is that it is a defence available to the 
doctor which, if he invokes it, he must prove. On both the test and the defence 
medical evidence will, of course, be of great importance.’84 
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There is persuasive authority for this position in certain US cases85 and indeed Lords Kerr 
and Reed hint at a similar conclusion in Montgomery when they speak of withholding 
information as a ‘reasonable exercise of medical judgment’.86  
However, it is not certain that a court would adopt this position. It is conceivable that 
some decisions about what information to withhold from a patient to protect them from 
serious harm might not require technical medical knowledge. There is no English case on 
point, but the Supreme Court of Hawai’i in Barcai v Betwee87 accepted that the matter will 
turn on the facts. In Barcai the court at first instance accepted the application of the TE 
when risks associated with the administration of anti-psychotic medication were not 
disclosed to a patient. The appeal court found that Dr Betwee's testimony had not 
established that the non-disclosure was based on considerations specific to Barcai’s case. A 
new trial was required in which Dr Betwee could raise the TE. It was held that expert 
testimony is generally (though not universally) required to assess the relevance of the 
therapeutic exception.88 This is because the jury (in this case) might lack the special 
knowledge and technical training to be able to determine the standard without expert 
evidence. 
Thus, there is potential for Bolam to remain relevant to the assessment of the clinician’s 
reasonableness in invoking the exception, at least in cases where the decision turns on 
expert medical knowledge. This would necessitate further legal differentiations between 
medical and non-medical judgement. Two problems flow from this. One relates to the 
ensuing legal complexity. Whilst Lords Kerr and Reed argued that any lack of clarity resulting 
from the new test for materiality was necessary in order to uphold patient dignity, it is not 
clear that the justification extends to the TE. Insofar as the TE puts in the hands of clinicians 
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the power to decide what is detrimental enough to warrant non-disclosure of material 
information that the courts have found necessary in order to equip patients to make an 
informed choice, the TE forms a potential contradiction with commitment to patient choice. 
Another problem is that however carefully the courts and professional guidance limit the 
extent of the TE, the warning in Canterbury v Spence that it ‘might devour the disclosure 
rule itself’89 holds true insofar as raising the TE risks ‘reBolamisation’ of the test for 
materiality.  
 
ii. Principle 
The TE was not relevant on the facts of Montgomery and so it is perhaps understandable 
that Lords Kerr and Reed did not set out a justification for its retention. They did however 
make clear that:  
[The TE] is a limited exception to the general principle that the patient should make 
the decision whether to undergo a proposed course of treatment: it is not intended 
to subvert that principle by enabling the doctor to prevent the patient from making 
an informed choice where she is liable to make a choice which the doctor considers 
to be contrary to her best interests.90  
It is clear then that the court is not committed to a broad welfare-based exception to the 
duty to inform. It would not, for example, apply to allow non-disclosure when it seems likely 
that the patient will refuse necessary treatment because of an overriding fear that the 
disclosed risk will materialise. The TE is far removed from the therapeutic privilege outlined 
in McAllister above. Three other possible justifications are considered here. 
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The first is that the Court sought to protect patients suffering from certain conditions 
which could be exacerbated by the shock or worry caused by disclosure of information and 
result in serious harm. Consider the facts of a Hawaiian case, Nishi v Hartwell,91 where the 
TE was successfully argued. There a patient suffering from chest pains was paralyzed due to 
an adverse reaction to drugs used in a radiological procedure to detect aneurysm. Clinicians 
had not informed him of the risk because he was already very frightened and suffered from 
hypertension. Disclosure might have led to serious harm. At the time the case was heard, it 
was accepted that the TE operates to protect the best interests of the patient.92 As we have 
seen, this is no longer the case in England and Wales. It is unlikely that the TE would be 
justified on similar facts. To do so would be to accept that clinicians can and arguably should 
withhold stress-inducing information from patients with a susceptibility to stress-related 
serious harm (such as heart attack and even depression). Whilst there may be compelling 
cases where non-disclosure might be justified because the risks are severe, the treatment is 
urgently needed and the opportunities to disclose information sensitively are very limited, 
they could exceptionally be justified under the doctrine of necessity.93 This would depend 
upon P being unable to make an informed decision; it not being practicable to communicate 
the material information to P; and the action taken being no more than is immediately 
required in P’s therapeutic interests.94  
Historically the TE might have been justified on the basis that the objective nature of the 
test (whether prudent professional or prudent patient) prevented the clinician from acting 
in the best interests of the particular patient. In Sidaway, Lord Scarman justified the 
therapeutic privilege on this basis: 
The ‘prudent patient’ cannot … always provide the answer for the obvious reason 
that he is a norm …, not a real person: and certainly not the patient himself. Hence 
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there is the need that the doctor should have the opportunity of proving that he 
reasonably believed that disclosure of the risk would be damaging to his patient or 
contrary to his best interest. This is what the Americans call the doctor's therapeutic 
privilege.’95 
In states that retain an objective test this reasoning might still apply, albeit usually with a 
higher threshold for the application of the TE based on prevention of serious harm. Thus, 
the New York Code recognises that one application for the TE is to allow the clinician to 
adapt the way information is disclosed to avoid harm to the patient. Under a prudent 
patient standard as proposed by Lord Scarman in Sidaway, the test is fact-sensitive but does 
not incorporate the characteristics of the individual patient. Emily Jackson (2006: p 281) has 
argued that the prudent patient test is an inadequate means of protecting patient self-
determination: 
Individual patients’ interests in information will vary dramatically. … Giving all 
patients the information that the abstract reasonable patient in their position would 
require might be preferable to the Bolam standard of disclosure, but it will result in 
some patients being provided with information that they do not want, while others 
will have been deprived of facts about the proposed treatment that are of vital 
importance to them. 
Considering this criticism, the TE would arguably serve an important ethical function, 
preserving the clinician’s duty to the actual patient, at least to the extent that it facilitates 
the doctor’s ability to respond to the particular patient’s preferences.  
But post-Montgomery, this reasoning no longer holds for two principal reasons. First, the 
Supreme Court makes clear that patients can now decide not to be informed of material 
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risks.96 Though the legal requirements for waiver are not fully articulated, it seems that 
patients will need to know and understand the basic information necessary to give a valid 
consent (and for the clinician to avoid a claim in battery),97 but the patient has the power to 
limit the details to which they are party. The right not to know is a controversial corollary of 
the right to information (Ost, 1984), but the law now extends beyond the requirement that 
material risks are disclosed and also requires disclosure of material information. The 
importance of patient control over the relevance of particular information is demonstrated 
by a consideration of the 2011 North Carolina law that prohibited women from having an 
abortion until their doctor had displayed ultrasound images of the foetus and read a state-
mandated text describing what the pregnant woman was seeing. In Stuart v Camnitz98 the 
US Court of Appeal held that this was a constitutional interference with doctors’ expressive 
rights due to the failure to incorporate a therapeutic exception. Doctors could not be 
coerced into voicing a message of childbirth over abortion, regardless of the therapeutic ill-
effects. In Montgomery, it was made clear that patients have a role to play in determining 
the relevance of the information to which they are subjected. There is perhaps more that 
professional bodies can do to make this abundantly clear to clinicians, patients and their 
families so that patients can exercise increased control over the (avoidance of) information 
that would be welcomed by the average patient but harmful to the particular patient. 
Second, the Supreme Court in Montgomery refined the test for materiality, introducing a 
subjective element to the test and placing increased focus on patient understanding. In 
common with the Australian case of Rogers,99 not only must clinicians provide information 
that a reasonable patient would consider relevant, but they must also disclose information 
where they are aware or ought reasonably to be aware that ‘the particular patient would be 
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likely to attach significance to it’.100 The significance of risk is now recognised as a nuanced 
and individualistic assessment:  
The significance of a given risk is likely to reflect a variety of factors besides its 
magnitude: for example, the nature of the risk, the effect which its occurrence would 
have upon the life of the patient, the importance to the patient of the benefits 
sought to be achieved by the treatment, the alternatives available, and the risks 
involved in those alternatives. The assessment is therefore fact-sensitive, and 
sensitive also to the characteristics of the patient.101 (italics added) 
Henceforth, not only must clinicians provide information on the material risks of the 
proposed treatment, they must also inform the patient of the risks and benefits of 
‘reasonable alternative or variant treatments’102 and the seriousness of the patient’s 
condition.103 The test is no longer one of ‘material risk’ but extends now to ‘material 
information’. The revised test does not simply require more information.104 Rather it is a 
matter or tailoring information to the reasonably ascertainable needs of the patient.105 A 
checklist approach is inappropriate. Consent must be bespoke. Dialogue between clinician 
and patient is essential.106 On this conception, the Montgomery test for materiality gives 
clinicians scope to adapt the information to the needs of the particular patient. Clinicians 
who insensitively communicate material risk in a manner that causes harm risk censure. But 
unless the patient lacks capacity or waives the right to disclosure, clinicians must make clear 
the material information needed for the patient to give informed consent.  
Consider a hypothetical example posed by Brazier and Cave (2016: p 146): ‘Would a 
surgeon be able to justify withholding from a very elderly patient the frightening 
information about the risk of impotence in an operation the surgeon judged to be essential 
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to maintain the patient’s independent living?’ Assuming the patient retains capacity, under 
Bolam it might have been argued that a reasonably prudent professional would withhold 
such information in the best interests of the patient; under Lord Scarman’s test it is likely 
that the prudent patient with the particular patient’s condition would find this information 
material in which case withholding the information would only be justified if the clinician 
reasonably believed it would be contrary to the best interests of the elderly patient. Under 
Montgomery however, the reasonable patient would attach significance to the risk but if the 
clinician had specific knowledge that the nature of the risk would be unlikely to adversely 
affect the patient but that the provision of information would frighten the patient and 
therefore obfuscate the decision, then there is scope to limit or adapt the information. 
Section 2(3) of the Mental Capacity Act makes clear that such ‘knowledge’ must not flow 
from unreasonable assumptions based on the patient’s age or other characteristics, but it 
might come from the patient himself. It might be, for example, that a family member or 
carer suggests that this information would alarm the patient in which case the clinician can 
explore this with the patient if there is a sense that disclosure would risk serious harm. 
Provided clinicians carefully recorded this in the patient’s notes they should have nothing to 
fear from the law of negligence or professional regulation. There is no need in these 
circumstances to invoke the therapeutic exception: the test for materiality is now 
sufficiently nuanced to allow clinicians limited scope to adapt the information to suit the 
needs of the particular patient. The scope is admittedly narrow, but this, it is submitted, is 
fitting given the emphasis in law and in Montgomery on preserving self-determination of 
adults with capacity to make decisions based on what in law is considered material 
information.  
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Another possible justification of the TE is that it might protect from serious harm those 
for whom disclosure would render them incapable of a rational decision. For example, there 
is legal authority for the proposition that a severe needle phobia can result in an inability to 
make a decision that can, in an emergency, justify treatment without consent.107 Might the 
phobia also justify non-disclosure of material information (for example that post-operative 
catheterization will be necessary), if mention of this information is likely to result in an 
irrational refusal of treatment that the patient otherwise desires? If the evidence suggests 
that, but for this information, the patient could make an autonomous treatment decision, 
withholding information might ostensibly enhance rational autonomy. Nonetheless, it is 
suggested in this section that such a conception would be inherently problematic. 
A distinction can be drawn between situations when disclosure of information will result 
in a decision that clinicians view to be irrational and disclosures that will destroy the 
patient’s capability for rational thought. As we have seen, it was made clear in Montgomery 
that the TE no longer extends to the former category. The decision is rational according to 
the individual’s value system, but irrational from an external viewpoint. But might the 
existence of the TE in Montgomery aim to allow clinicins scope for non-disclosure when the 
information is likely to cause such a reaction as to render P incapable of a rational decision?  
McLean (2009: p 19) has recognised that: ‘Irrespective of those philosophical approaches 
which seek to make autonomy a richer concept, it is the decision-making aspect of 
autonomy that dominates in law.’ Coggon and Miola (2011: p 538) agree that the law on 
information disclosure has traditionally upheld a liberal conception of free choice but argue 
that it inadequately protected patient autonomy. They cite Al Hamwi v Johnston and 
Another108 as an example. There it was held that doctors providing the requisite information 
were not, on the facts, responsible for the patient’s failure to understand it. The law was 
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interpreted to focus on the mechanics of providing material information rather than its 
effectiveness in equipping the patient to make an autonomous decision. Coggon and Miola 
argue that this emphasises ostensible rather than substantive autonomy. 
The subjective refinement of the prudent patient test and reference to the patient’s 
characteristics in Montgomery implies commitment to patient autonomy rather than a 
purely liberal conception of informed consent that focuses on mere provision of 
information. Clinicians are now required to engage in ‘dialogue, the aim of which is to 
ensure that the patient understands’109 the material information. This represents a positive 
development, distancing the law on informed consent from a mechanical checklist approach 
and demanding meaningful engagement with the patient. Nevertheless, insofar as the 
judgment hints at a substantive model of autonomy, the corollary of protecting the 
substantive autonomy rights of those capable of engaging in the consent process, is that 
those who are rendered incapable might be deemed worthy of paternalistic protection. 
Beneficence in the form of the TE might be utilised to safeguard the welfare interests of 
those patients whom clinicians reasonably believe would be rendered incapable of a 
rational decision and subjected to serious harm if the material risk is disclosed. If so, this 
marks a divergent approach from the Mental Capacity Act 2005 which utilises incapacity as 
the benchmark for best interests decision-making. Admittedly, such divergence is evident in 
recent developments of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court to protect people from 
harmful involuntary decisions (Cave, 2017).110 But the application of the inherent 
jurisdiction is judicial rather than clinical; it would be more difficult in the case of the TE to 
ensure that its application is facilitative of autonomy rights so as to enhance (rather than 
limit) commitment to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.111  
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4. Is the therapeutic privilege obsolete?  
Rejection of the TE on the basis of the procedural difficulties it causes and the dangers of 
medical paternalism would not leave vulnerable patients without protection. In addition to 
the safety nets of necessity, the right to decline information and the professional duty to 
provide information in a sensitive manner, the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) sets out a scheme 
to protect patients incapable of a capacitous decision. This section will argue that the MCA 
is relevant to decisions around information disclosure and that its best interests framework 
serves to protect those who lack capacity. It is submitted therefore that the TE is obsolete 
and that its existence has potential to contradict the principles of the MCA by subjecting 
those capable of a capacitous decision to a best interests framework because they are at 
risk of serious harm, without appropriate safeguards.  
Section 1(2) of the MCA establishes an assumption of capacity that can only be rebutted if 
the individual is unable to make a decision due to an ‘impairment of, or a disturbance in the 
functioning of, the mind or brain’ (section 2(1)) that renders him unable:  
(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, 
(b) to retain that information, 
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or 
(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other 
means). (Section 3(1)) 
If P meets the diagnostic threshold and lacks the requisite understanding, then section 4 
sets out a scheme for making decisions in P’s best interests, where possible with P’s 
participation. In such a case the duty to disclose would be influenced by the test for 
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materiality but dominated by the best interests test. There would be no duty to disclose 
material risks that cause the patient serious harm. Where the MCA applies, there is no need 
to rely on the TE. But the extent of the Act’s application in the context of information 
disclosure is unclear. The Act provides a model for decision-making rather than information 
provision.  
i. Can a capacitous decision be made without disclosure of material risks? 
The first issue is that it is not immediately clear from the Act what information must be 
understood, retained, used or weighed and communicated in order that the decision be 
considered capacitous. The remit of the Act extends beyond medical treatment to residence 
and welfare decisions. It is no surprise therefore that Section 3 does not map neatly onto 
the laws of battery and negligence. In requiring that P ‘understand the information relevant 
to the decision’ in order to make the decision, then as a minimum, the basic information 
necessary for a valid consent must be communicated and understood. If this is all that is 
required then the TE might have a legitimate role in those cases where the patient 
understands enough to make a valid, capacitous consent but lacks the ability to understand 
material risks and cannot therefore make an informed consent. But does the Act suggest 
such a conception? Section 3(2) accepts that the quality of information might be adapted to 
suit the needs of the individual.112 But section 3(2) concerns the delivery of the information 
rather than its content. Section 3(4) provides:  
The information relevant to a decision includes information about the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of— (a) deciding one way or another, or (b) failing to 
make the decision. 
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The Code of Practice (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2007: para 3.9) requires that 
risks and benefits are explained, and that ‘important information’ is not omitted. This goes 
beyond the basic information required to avoid a claim in battery. Case law confirms that 
whilst P is not necessarily required to understand, retain, use or weigh and communicate all 
the information that is provided in order to be considered capacitous, P must be able to 
process the ‘salient factors’.113 P must understand the ‘relevant information’ and given that 
informed consent is now ‘firmly part of English law’,114 this must logically include the 
material risks. Lords Kerr and Reed make clear that: 
An adult person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available 
forms of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment 
interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken. The doctor is therefore under a 
duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks 
involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or 
variant treatments.115 
It seems consistent to assume that ‘sound mind’ is synonymous with ‘capacity’, a term 
which Lady Hale employs specifically.116 The conclusion is that, subject to the TE, all adult 
patients with capacity are entitled to material information. Those who lack capacity are still 
entitled to participate ‘as fully as possible’ (Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4(4)) but this is a 
determination that is to be made by the decision-maker in the reasonable belief that the 
decision is in P’s best interests (Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4(9)). In other words, best 
interests and not the law on battery or clinical negligence governs the risks that must be 
disclosed to a patient who lacks capacity.  
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ii. Does the MCA require provision of information before a decision is reached about 
capacity? 
This section argues that there are circumstances in which the MCA can apply to protect P 
from harmful information on the basis that P lacks mental capacity and that this renders the 
TE unnecessary.  
The application of the best interests framework relies on the clinician being able to 
establish that P lacks capacity. Can clinicians make an ex ante decision that the patient lacks 
capacity before the information is provided? Section 2(3) guards against assumptions about 
capacity on the basis of a person’s behaviour or condition. And the Code of Practice 
(Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2007: para 4.16) makes clear that: ‘It is important 
not to assess someone’s understanding before they have had information’.117 On the other 
hand, consent is a dynamic process. If it is apparent that P cannot understand certain salient 
information, there is no obligation to provide further, potentially harmful information if it is 
not in P’s best interests to do so. In other words, an ex ante determination of capacity is not 
ruled out in all circumstances.  
Section 3(1)(c) requires that in order to have capacity P must be able to weigh the 
information and use it to make a decision. If an impairment renders the person unable to 
weigh certain aspects of information and those aspects are necessary in order for the 
decision to be informed, then that person can be said to lack capacity. The Code of Practice 
(Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2007: para 4.21) gives the example of a person with 
an eating disorder who might be able to understand information about the consequences of 
not eating, but unable to weigh that information in order to make the specific decision 
because of their eating disorder.  
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Returning to the above example of a patient with a severe needle phobia who is likely to 
withhold consent to an operation s/he desires if told the material information that post-
operative catheterization will be necessary, it was submitted that there are dangers in using 
the TE to justify non-disclosure due to the potential for medical paternalism. However, if it is 
reasonably believed that in relation to this specific issue, P lacks capacity to use or weigh the 
material information that is required in order for P to make an informed consent, then there 
is an argument that P lacks capacity.  
The threshold is high: To use Hedley J’s articulation, P might be shown to lack ‘the 
capacity actually to engage in the decision-making process itself and to be able to see the 
various parts of the argument and to relate the one to another.’118 In Re SB119 a woman with 
bi-polar disorder did not lack capacity to decide to have an abortion at 24 weeks despite 
psychiatric evidence that she could not use and weigh information concerning the support 
that her husband and mother would provide, due to paranoid thoughts. She was able to 
rationally use and weigh other information that was sufficient to enable her to make a 
capacitous decision. Indeed: ‘She perfectly understands any risks to her from undergoing a 
termination, which have been fully explained to her by the doctor …’120  
SB can be contrasted with Cambridge University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v BF,121 
where McDonald J held that a person with paranoid schizophrenia lacked capacity to 
consent to or to refuse medical treatment for ovarian cancer: 
 
[I]n order to understand, and in order to use or weigh information relevant to the 
decision in issue a person has to have some capacity for rational thought regarding 
that information. Where a person labours under a condition that substantially 
deprives them of control of their thought process such that rational considerations 
37 
 
concerning the relevant information are overpowered by involuntary irrational 
considerations … it is difficult to see how that person may be said to be able to 
understand or to use or weigh information relevant to the decision in question.  
Consider Dooley v Skodnek,122 one of the few cases internationally where the TE was 
successfully raised. A New York appellate court held that disclosure of information about 
treatment for a psychiatric condition might be withheld, at least temporarily where the 
patient suffered an acute phase of illness. In England and Wales it seems that non-disclosure 
in such a case might potentially be justifiable under the Mental Capacity Act. Another 
example is the Australian case of Battersby v Tottman123 where a patient suffering from 
psychosis was not warned that the drug Mellaril had potential to damage her eyesight. Had 
the clinician explained the risks, it was likely that Mrs Battersby would have stopped taking 
the medication, in which case she would have been at a significant risk of committing 
suicide. The therapeutic privilege was accepted in defence of the decision not to disclose 
the risk. If clinicians faced a similar situation in England and Wales, there is scope to argue 
that the claimant lacked capacity to make the decision. Provided this belief was reasonable, 
P could be furnished with all the information that is in her best interests and a decision 
made with her participation.  
Where a person’s impairment of the mind results in them being unable to understand, 
use or weigh the information about material risks, they lack capacity to make a decision. 
Similarly, there may be circumstances where the clinician reasonably believes that the 
disclosure of a material risk would render a patient with an impairment of the mind or brain 
unable to make a decision, so justifying withholding the information on the ground that P 
lacks capacity. The TE, I would argue, is redundant in such circumstances. Whilst it might 
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seem heavy-handed to deny such a person capacity, recall first that capacity is decision-
specific. It is only this decision that the patient in all the circumstances is incapable of 
making. Also, recall that incapacity does not mean that P should not take as full a role as 
possible in the decision. Finally, one might argue that the Court of Protection is a more 
suitable setting in which to adjudicate questions about the patient’s ability to understand 
and the clinician’s duty to disclose than pursuing fault-based litigation in the compensation-
orientated High Court. Decisions to withhold information should be discussed with the 
person’s family or carers so that they can inform the decision about what information is in 
the best interests of the patient and can refer the case to the Court of Protection in the 
event of dispute. 
As was made clear in Montgomery, patient autonomy is relevant not only to the 
acceptance or refusal of treatment offered by clinicians but also to the process of informed 
consent. If P lacks capacity to engage in that process then it is right and proper that the MCA 
best interest framework is engaged. Equally, I would submit that if P does not lack capacity; 
treatment is not urgently required to avoid serious harm; and P has not waived the right to 
information, then P has a right to the sensitively portrayed information required to make an 
informed decision.  
 
Conclusion 
Disclosure of information to patients can serve several purposes. It might have therapeutic 
benefits designed to allay fears and promote wellbeing. It can also serve the patient’s 
interests in self-determination. This article is concerned with the latter. Medical law in 
England and Wales upholds the right of adults with capacity to consent to or refuse medical 
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treatment, irrespective of the rationality of the decision and its potential to cause the 
patient harm. Without pertinent information, patients are robbed of the ability to reason 
and make their own decisions whether to undergo the recommended treatment. Nor do 
England and Wales stand alone in protecting and promoting patient choice. The Council of 
Europe’s Oviedo Biomedicine convention 1997, signed by 35 states (though not the UK124), 
represents a minimum standard of harmonization. Article 5 requires that medical 
interventions are only carried out once free and informed consent has been given and that 
the patient is furnished with ‘appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the 
intervention as well as on its consequences and risks’.  
Montgomery embraces a more substantive version of autonomy than was previously 
accommodated in the law on informed consent. Clinicians should engage in dialogue 
designed to ensure that patients understand125 material information including information 
about risks and alternatives126 that is ‘fact-sensitive, and sensitive also to the characteristics 
of the patient’. 127 This is not an edict requiring clinicians to provide patients with more and 
more information; it is a requirement that, where practicable, patients’ individual needs 
should be accommodated so as to make their choices meaningful. The effects of 
Montgomery should not be exaggerated. It does not create a freestanding claim for breach 
of duty to make an informed choice128 and it has not led to a huge increase in successful 
claims for negligent information disclosure.129 It does recognise that material information is 
needed in order to make an informed decision, and that informed consent is firmly part of 
law. Yet, in common with a number of jurisdictions, the Supreme Court judgment in 
Montgomery recognised that the duty to disclose material information before obtaining 
patient consent is subject to a therapeutic exception (TE). Articulation of the precise scope 
of the TE and its justification were left to future decisions. This article has analysed the legal 
40 
 
development of the therapeutic exception in England and Wales and made comparisons 
with the USA, Australia and Canada, so as to provide new insights on the relationships 
between informed consent and mental capacity; patient autonomy and medical 
beneficence.  In light of this, it has been suggested that in England and Wales the TE is 
unnecessary and unjustified and that its existence is problematic in law and principle. 
The TE was not relevant on the facts of Montgomery, and the Court’s acceptance of its 
existence was possibly influenced by domestic and international precedent. In fact, the 
domestic application is of little relevance because previous assertions of the ‘therapeutic 
privilege’ reacted to limitations of the objective materiality test to protect the interests of 
the particular patient. Montgomery incorporates a subjective component into the prudent 
patient test and in doing so removes one possible justification for the TE.130 In international 
jurisprudence the existence of the TE may be widespread, but its application is rare. Even in 
Australia where the objective and subjective limbs to the test for materiality most closely 
map onto the Montgomery test, Mulheron (2003) has said:  
 
[The TE] was specifically endorsed as part of Australian law by the High Court in 
Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. However, there has been negligible 
application of the defence since that endorsement. …. [T]he defence has been so 
narrowly interpreted since, such that it has come to occupy an almost untenable 
position in Australia's medical jurisprudence. 
Lords Kerr and Reed limited the scope of the TE, framing it as an ‘exception’ rather than a 
‘privilege’ and distancing it from a broad best interests application. In doing so they 
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removed another potential justification for the TE: the paternalistic protection of patient 
welfare.  
Nor would it be consistent for the TE to apply whenever disclosure could exacerbate a 
medical condition and cause harm. To do so would create a wide exception and potentially 
even a duty to limit material information where the patient has a particular sensitivity (for 
example hypertension) which might result in harm (for example heart attack) if disclosure 
causes undue stress. Montgomery itself makes clear that the information should be adapted 
to the characteristics of the patient131 and sensitively portrayed.132 Exceptions will apply 
where the patient waives the right to certain information, and potentially if the treatment is 
very urgent and the patient cannot consent in which case non-disclosure may be justified 
under the doctrine of necessity. An exception might also exist if the patient has an anxiety 
disorder or other ‘impairment’ so as to satisfy section 2(1) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(MCA). If the patient is incapable of understanding the material information, the best 
interests framework will apply on the basis that the patient lacks capacity. But there are 
questions about the potential application of the MCA to information disclosure and the 
suitability of the MCA’s best interests framework to adequately protect those who are 
rendered incapable of rational decision-making by the disclosure of information. If the legal 
system cannot protect vulnerable patients in circumstances where the disclosure of material 
information will render them unable to make an autonomous decision about treatment, 
then the TE might serve a useful function.  
The Mental Capacity Act sets out a scheme to protect those incapable of autonomous 
decision-making but there is ambiguity regarding the information that must be understood 
as part of the section 3 test. I have argued that the ‘salient information’ in the case of a 
person consenting to treatment is the information about risks and benefits that is in law 
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considered ‘material’. Difficulty also surrounds those cases where clinicians might seek to 
avoid serious harm that will result before a person can reasonably be considered to lack 
capacity. This is because the Act ostensibly requires that a person is furnished with the 
information upon which to make a decision before clinicians determine that the person 
lacks capacity. However, I have argued that in the dynamic process of consent an apparent 
inability to understand does not require clinicians to blithely recite risks and benefits that 
the patient cannot take in, regardless of the confusion and harm it will cause. There is 
therefore scope within the terms of the Act to prevent serious harm caused by disclosure 
when it is apparent that the patient is incapable of using or weighing the particular 
information, in which case beneficent protection is appropriate according to section 4 of the 
Act. 
The result is that, whilst the TE might be justifiable in some jurisdictions to protect the 
autonomy interests of certain patients and the best interests of non-autonomous patients, 
it is not required in England and Wales. Future cases governing the extent of the TE present 
two options. One is to recognise that, in the specific context of information disclosure, the 
TE is necessary because the MCA does not adequately protect those who are unable to 
make an autonomous decision. This would continue a trend established in the recent 
development of the inherent jurisdiction to protect those who have capacity but lack the 
ability to make a voluntary decision (Cave, 2017). Conversely, this article has suggested that 
the Mental Capacity Act’s protective scheme extends to such patients, in which case a 
principled justification for the TE is lacking. In England and Wales, the existence of the TE 
raises the potential for the Bolam test to remain relevant to information disclosure cases. In 
the context of risk disclosure, it is unnecessary and anomalous. It sacrifices coherence and 
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clarity and will constitute a source of confusion for practitioners (Royal College of Surgeons, 
2016: para 4.2). 
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